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Involuntary autobiographical memories in and outside the laboratory: How different are they  
from voluntary autobiographical memories? 
Abstract 
Two studies compared the characteristics and retrieval times of involuntary and voluntary 
autobiographical memory under controlled laboratory conditions. A new laboratory task of 
involuntary autobiographical memories involved detecting vertical lines in a stream of stimuli 
with horizontal lines (an undemanding vigilance task) and recording any involuntary memories 
during the session. The majority of these memories were reported as being triggered by 
irrelevant cue-phrases presented on the screen. Voluntary autobiographical memories were 
sampled via a standard word-cue method in Session 2. The results showed that involuntary 
memories were more specific and retrieved significantly faster than voluntary memories. They 
were also more likely to be triggered by negative cues while cue valence did not have any effect 
on the number of voluntary memories. Furthermore, laboratory involuntary memories did not 
differ from naturalistic involuntary memories recorded in a diary by the same participants 
(Study 2). Taken together, these results have important implications for current theories of 
autobiographical memory and open up interesting avenues for future research. 
 
Keywords: Involuntary autobiographical memories; Voluntary autobiographical memories; 
Retrieval times; Direct retrieval; Memory specificity  
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Involuntary autobiographical memories in and outside the laboratory: How different are they 
from voluntary autobiographical memories? 
Research on autobiographical memory is primarily based on a method in which 
participants deliberately recall personally experienced past events in response to a particular 
word or phrase provided by the experimenter (the so called word-cue technique, see Conway & 
Bekerian, 1987; Haque & Conway, 2001; Rubin, 2005). Alternatively, participants may be 
asked to recall their most vivid or most important memories (Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Rubin & 
Schulkind, 1997a). However, autobiographical memories can also come to mind spontaneously 
without any conscious or deliberate attempt to retrieve them. Despite their prevalence in 
everyday life, these involuntary autobiographical memories have received relatively little 
attention with only a dozen of published empirical studies on the topic (e.g., Ball, 2007; Ball & 
Little, 2006; Berntsen, 1996; 1998; Bernsten & Hall, 2004; Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Hall & 
Berntsen, 2008; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Mace, 2004; 2005; 2006; Schlagman, 
Kvavilashvili & Schulz, 2007; Watkins, Grimm, Whitney & Brown, 2005). Almost all of these 
studies have used the diary and questionnaire methods of enquiry.  
Results from these initial diary studies indicate that there are certain optimal conditions 
in which involuntary memories occur in everyday life. First, they are more likely to come to 
mind while the person is engaged in fairly routine, automatic activities that require little 
attention, for example, making a cup of tea or brushing one’s teeth (Berntsen, 1998; 
Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007). Second, the majority of memories are 
elicited by easily identifiable cues most of which correspond to and form central features of the 
memory content (Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007). Cues have 
also been found to be predominantly external (i.e., present in the environment) as opposed to 
internal thoughts (Ball & Little, 2006; Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Kvavilashvili & 
Mandler, 2004; Mace, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007). Furthermore, Berntsen (2007) reports that 
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the majority of external cues from her 1998 diary study (i.e., 66%) were peripheral aspects of 
the environment, i.e., aspects of the environment that were not directly related to the current 
activity of the rememberer.  
Another set of important findings concerns the characteristics of involuntary 
autobiographical memories. For example, involuntary memories have been repeatedly found to 
be of specific events as opposed to general events (Ball & Little, 2006; Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen 
& Hall, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007). This predominance of specific events is in sharp contrast 
to mainstream research on voluntary autobiographical memories, whereby people often recall 
general events even when explicitly asked to provide specific memories (Barsalou, 1988; 
Linton, 1986; Williams & Dritschel, 1992).  
At present, there are only three studies that have directly compared involuntary and 
voluntary autobiographical memories within one sample of participants (Ball, 2007; Berntsen & 
Hall, 2004; Mace, 2006). In all three studies, the percentage of reported specific involuntary 
memories was reliably higher than the percentage of specific voluntary autobiographical 
memories (see also Berntsen, 1998, who obtained a similar finding using a between subjects 
design). However, findings concerning other memory characteristics have been less consistent. 
For example, Berntsen (1998) reported that involuntary memories were more positive and recent 
but less rehearsed than voluntary memories. These findings were not replicated in a study by 
Berntsen and Hall (2004) in which no differences were observed in terms of age of memories or 
prior rehearsal but involuntary memories were less positive and more unusual than voluntary 
memories.   
It is obvious that more systematic research is needed to examine potential differences 
and similarities between these two forms of memory. According to Mace (2007) this “is perhaps 
the most challenging question facing involuntary memory research” (p. 7). Of particular interest 
is to compare the retrieval times of involuntary and voluntary memories as this may provide 
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important insights into the underlying mechanisms of involuntary memories as well as the 
structure and organisation of the autobiographical memory system. However, in contrast to 
voluntary autobiographical memories, no information is currently available about the retrieval 
times of involuntary memories due to the absence of a suitable laboratory paradigm. In order to 
achieve this aim, the studies presented in this paper simulated the conditions of naturally 
occurring involuntary memories (i.e., diffused attention and easily identifiable cues), which 
allowed the capture of involuntary memories ‘on-line’ and measurement of their retrieval times.  
In order to create a state of diffused attention in the laboratory, participants had to carry 
out an undemanding and monotonous vigilance task, which involved detecting infrequently 
presented vertical lines in a stream of stimuli with horizontal lines. Previous research by 
Giambra (1989; 1995) has shown that undemanding vigilance tasks reliably induce task 
unrelated thoughts or mind-wandering which are characteristic of many everyday habitual 
activities such as washing up or brushing one’s teeth (see also Singer, 1993; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006).  In addition to the vigilance task, however, we simultaneously presented 
written phrases such as going on holiday, childhood nightmares and buttering bread on the 
computer screen. The phrases were irrelevant to the on-going vigilance task as participants were 
instructed to ignore them (see method section) but it was expected that at least some of these 
phrases would elicit involuntary autobiographical memories. If an involuntary memory occurred 
during the task, the participant indicated this by pressing the specified key, which 
stopped/paused the task while they recorded their memory. The participant then returned to the 
vigilance task repeating the procedure each time an involuntary memory was experienced.  
The results of an initial pilot study using this procedure showed that participants did 
report experiencing involuntary memories during the vigilance task (Kvavilashvili & 
Schlagman, 2003). Most importantly, the majority of elicited memories were reported to be 
triggered by cue phrases presented on the screen which made it possible to measure the retrieval 
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times of these memories (time taken from the presentation of the cue phrase and the reported 
memory). Therefore, in order to compare involuntary and voluntary memories, two studies were 
conducted in which participants completed two sessions, one week apart. In the involuntary 
memory session, participants carried out the vigilance task, and in the voluntary session they 
deliberately recalled memories in response to word phrases presented on the screen (i.e., 
traditional word-cue experiment). 
Study 1 
The primary objective of Study 1 was to compare the retrieval times of involuntary and 
voluntary memories. In line with previous research on autobiographical memory, it was 
predicted that the retrieval of voluntary memories in response to word cues would be a slow and 
effortful process that would take, on average, up to 10 seconds (e.g., see Rubin, 1998). These 
slow retrieval times are thought to reflect the hierarchical organisation of autobiographical 
memory which incorporates information at different levels of specificity from very abstract, 
such as lifetime periods (e.g., when I was a PhD student), to specific sensory-perceptual details 
of particular events. Therefore, it takes time to access the bottom of the hierarchy and construct 
a particular memory from available fragments of event-specific knowledge (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
In contrast, the retrieval of involuntary memories is considered to be a fast and 
automatic process that is mediated by so called “direct retrieval” mechanism (see Conway & 
Playdell-Pearce, 2000). This assumption is based on the observation that during voluntary 
retrieval, in response to word-cues, participants can occasionally retrieve specific memories 
within two seconds (e.g., Haque & Conway, 2001; also see Conway & Bekerian, 1987). To 
account for such unusually fast retrieval times, Conway (2005) proposed that these memories 
are likely to be directly retrieved from a separate pool of very recent memories (probably 
from the last 24 hours or less) that have not yet been fully consolidated into the hierarchical 
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structure of autobiographical memory. However, currently there is no information about the 
retrieval times of those involuntary memories that come to mind when one is not in the 
retrieval mode (i.e., deliberately trying to recall memories in response to cue words). In 
addition, it is unclear whether these memories are directly retrieved from a separate pool of 
highly active recent memories, as suggested by Conway (2005). Initial evidence suggests that 
this may not be the case. For example, in a diary study of Ball and Little (2006), only 3% of 
recorded involuntary memories were from the last 24 hours, with the majority of memories 
(66%) being two or more years old. 
 The second objective was to compare the two types of memories in terms of several 
important memory characteristics such as specificity, age of memory, rehearsal, emotional 
valence, etc. In line with previous studies, it was predicted that involuntary memories would be 
more specific than voluntary memories (e.g., Ball & Little, 2006; Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & 
Hall, 2004; Mace, 2006). However, no predictions were made for other memory characteristics 
due to the inconsistent findings obtained in two previous studies that compared involuntary 
diary and voluntary word-cued memories (see Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004).  
The final objective of Study 1 was to examine how the emotional valence of cues affects 
the number and nature of involuntary and voluntary memories. Thus, equal numbers of positive, 
neutral and negative cue-phrases were presented to participants during both involuntary and 
voluntary memory sessions. A key question of interest is to see which cues are more likely to 
elicit involuntary memories. For voluntary memories, the predictions are relatively 
straightforward. Since the recall is deliberate and purposeful (i.e., retrieving a memory in 
response to a cue), participants should be equally likely to recall memories in response to 
positive, neutral and negative cue phrases. This however, may not be the case for involuntary 
memories where recall is not attempted and certain cues may be more likely to spontaneously 
elicit memories than others. For example, one may speculate that emotional cues may be better 
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than neutral cues in eliciting involuntary memories. Alternatively, it can be predicted, based on 
evolutionary perspective, that negative cues are more important for survival and hence will be 
more likely to elicit involuntary memories than positive and neutral cues (e.g., Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). A related question was to examine the relationship 
between the valence of the cue-phrase and participants’ own ratings of the emotional valence of 
their memories. If cues form part of the remembered event, as shown by Berntsen (1998) and 
Schlagman et al. (2007), then valence ratings should be highest for memories retrieved to 
positive cue-words and lowest for memories retrieved to negative cue-words, irrespective of 
memory type.  
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-seven participants (14 males and 23 females) were recruited from 
psychology undergraduates and by word of mouth. Twenty-nine participants were students and 
the remaining eight had various professions including lecturer, social worker, teacher and estate 
agent. Their ages ranged from 18 to 38 with a mean age of 22.73 (SD = 5.63). All participants’ 
first language was English. They were paid £5 for each session with an average duration of 
approximately 1 hour. If the session lasted more than 80 minutes, the participant was given an 
extra £3. 
 Materials  
Session 1: Involuntary recall. The vigilance task was a 20-minute program created with 
SuperLab software and presented on an Apple Macintosh laptop. The program consisted of 800 
trials each showing a card (approximately 21.5cm by 12.5cm in size) depicting either a pattern 
of black horizontal or black vertical lines. The target stimuli appeared on 15 trials and consisted 
of a pattern of black vertical lines (see Appendix 1). The target patterns were randomly chosen 
from six basic patterns with between four and eight vertical lines. The non-target stimuli were 
presented on 785 trials and consisted of patterns of black horizontal lines. The non-target 
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patterns were randomly selected from twelve basic patterns with between four and eight lines. In 
addition to the pattern, a word-phrase (e.g., Relaxing on a beach; Missed opportunity; Crossing 
the road) was shown on each trial. The phrases were presented in size 18 Arial font and placed 
in the middle of each card. They were used instead of single words (often used in voluntary 
autobiographical memory research) because they were more similar to types of cues reported by 
participants in our previous diary studies (e.g., ‘My boyfriend mentioned Karvol drops’ or ‘the 
newspaper article I was reading’). The 800 trials were shown in a fixed order and continuously 
with each trial remaining on the screen for 1.5 seconds. Target patterns occurred randomly every 
60 to 90 seconds (i.e., 40 to 60 trials) to ensure they came at fairly long and irregular intervals.  
 To control the emotional valence of cue-phrases, a total of 1492 phrases were generated 
by the authors and were given to eight independent coders to rate as either negative, neutral or 
positive. Percentage of agreement was taken as a measure of inter-rater reliability and only 
phrases with an agreement of 75% or above were included, giving a pool of 1176 cue-phrases. 
Out of this pool, 800 phrases were randomly selected and approximately equal numbers of 
negative (N=267), neutral (N=266) and positive (N=267) phrases were used.  
Session 2: Voluntary recall. A total of 24 new phrases (eight negative, eight neutral and 
eight positive) that had not been shown during Session 1 were randomly presented on an Apple 
Macintosh laptop with a program created by SuperLab software. Cue-phrases were in size 18 
Arial font and shown in the middle of cards depicting black horizontal lines (taken from the 
non-target stimuli with horizontal lines shown in Session 1). In addition to 24 cue-phrases, 
participants were also shown the cue-phrases that had triggered their involuntary memories in 
Session 1 (the old and new phrases were intermixed and presented in random order). Therefore, 
the total number of cue-phrases presented varied and was dependent on the number of memories 
reported during Session 1. The rationale was to examine whether the same memories would be 
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voluntarily retrieved to the cues that had elicited involuntary memories earlier. However, in this 
paper, only the data on 24 new cue-phrases will be reported.  
Imagery and concreteness of cue-phrases. To ensure that cue-phrases used in the 
voluntary and involuntary sessions were comparable, two new groups of participants rated the 
phrases for imagery (N=14) and concreteness (N=13) on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1=low to 
7=high). The mean ratings as a function of cue type (involuntary, voluntary) and cue valence 
(negative, neutral, positive) were calculated for each participant and entered into two separate 
within subjects ANOVAs with concreteness and imagery as dependent variables. In both 
ANOVAs, there was no main effect of cue type (Fs<1) or a cue type by cue valence interaction 
(Fs<1). This means that cue-phrases used in voluntary and involuntary sessions were 
comparable in terms of these characteristics. There was, however, a main effect of cue valence 
for both concreteness F(2,48)=31.87, p<.001, η²=.64 and imagery F(2,52)=43.94, p<.001, 
η²=.63. Post hoc analyses revealed that the mean concreteness rating for neutral cue-phrases 
(M=5.36) was significantly higher than for negative (N=4.10) and positive cue-phrases 
(M=3.93) (ps<.001), which did not differ from one another (p=.18). The mean imagery rating 
for neutral cue-phrases (M=5.36) was also significantly higher than for positive (M=4.34) cue-
phrases (p<.001) which was significantly higher than for negative (M=4.06) cue-phrases 
(p=.02). Thus, negative cue-phrases were rated overall as lower on imagery and concreteness 
than neutral phrases. 
Autobiographical memory questionnaire. In Session 1, participants recorded details of 
their memories using a pre-structured two-page questionnaire. The first page required 
participants to write a description of the content of the memory, and to indicate whether the 
memory was triggered by something (either in one’s thoughts or in the environment) or whether 
there was no trigger. If participants indicated that the memory was triggered, then they wrote a 
description of what the trigger was in their own words. Finally, they rated how much they were 
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concentrating on the vigilance task when the memory came to mind on a 5-point scale (1=not at 
all concentrating; 5=fully concentrating). The second page of the questionnaire requested further 
details and evaluations of memory characteristics such as participants’ age in the memory, how 
often the memory had been thought of/rehearsed before (1=never, 2=sometimes, 3=often, 
4=quite often, and 5=very often), how unusual or common the remembered event was (1=very 
common; 5=very unusual), what was the emotional valence of the memory (1=very negative; 
3=neutral; 5=very positive), and whether the remembered event was general or specific.  
An identical, two-page questionnaire was used in Session 2 to record voluntary 
memories, with the exception that questions concerning the trigger of the memory and levels of 
concentration were omitted.  
 Procedure. Participants were tested individually. In Session 1, participants were told that 
they were taking part in a study examining concentration and that they would be required to 
carry out a vigilance task in which they had to detect a randomly presented target stimuli 
(consisting of a pattern of vertical lines) from a large number of non-target stimuli (consisting of 
a pattern of horizontal lines). Each time a target stimulus was detected participants had to 
respond by saying ‘yes’ out loud (and the experimenter recorded their responses). Additionally, 
participants were informed that they would also see words in the centre of the pattern but they 
were instructed to ignore these. It was explained that the condition they were taking part in was 
looking at how people could keep their concentration on the patterns, and in another condition 
participants would have to concentrate on the words and ignore the lines. At this point 
participants were given a short, 1-minute practice trial which contained three target stimuli.  
 Once the experimenter was assured that the participant understood the requirements of 
the vigilance task, it was explained that due to the task being quite monotonous they could 
possibly find themselves thinking about other things, which was quite normal. Thoughts 
unrelated to the vigilance task could concern many things like, for example, a current project, 
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future goals, daydreams or memories from one’s past and it was explained that we were also 
interested in some of these unrelated thoughts. The experimenter went on to explain that some 
unrelated thoughts maybe past memories that spontaneously ‘pop’ to mind, and the nature of 
involuntary autobiographical memory was explained. It was also pointed out that memories 
could be of specific or general events, from one’s recent or remote past, etc.  
 Participants were instructed that their main task was to continue to respond by saying 
‘yes’ out loud each time they saw the target vertical lines, but if, in addition, an involuntary 
autobiographical memory came to mind then they should click the mouse, which would stop the 
vigilance task and record their memory. Once the experimenter was assured the instructions 
were understood the participants started the task. If the participants clicked the mouse to indicate 
a memory had come to mind, then this cleared the current trial/stimuli from the screen and 
presented a feedback screen ‘Record your memory and then click the mouse to return to the 
vigilance task’ for an unlimited time interval. Participants were handed a questionnaire and 
completed the first page, the experimenter explained each question in detail for the first memory 
reported by each participant. After completing the first page of the questionnaire participants 
clicked the mouse again to return to the vigilance task, repeating this procedure for each 
involuntary memory that came to mind. At the end of the task the experimenter explained each 
question on the second page of the questionnaire and the participants then completed one for 
each memory they had recorded during the vigilance task.  
Session 2 took place approximately one week after Session 1 and was undertaken in the 
same location and at approximately the same time. Participants were told that the computer 
screen would look very similar to that shown in the first session as they would be shown several 
cards with words at the centre of a pattern of horizontal lines. However, this time they would be 
required to deliberately retrieve a past memory associated to the words presented on the screen. 
It was explained that each word-phrase would remain on the screen for one minute and that they 
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should try to recall a past memory as quickly as possible. As soon as the memory was retrieved 
they had to click the mouse which would clear the current phrase from the screen and present 
feedback screen ‘Record your memory and then click the mouse to return to the task’ for an 
unlimited time interval. During this time, the first page of the questionnaire would be completed. 
This procedure would then be repeated for each of the cue-phrases presented. If participants 
were unable to recall a past memory within one minute, the computer would automatically move 
on to the next word. It was also reiterated that past memories could be general or specific in 
nature and very recent or remote. Once all the cue-phrases had been presented the participant 
completed page two of the questionnaire for each memory they had recorded.  
 Data analysis. For Study 1 and Study 2, the data were treated in the same way. Before 
conducting any analyses, all involuntary and voluntary memories were read through to check 
that they were autobiographical in nature. Coding was carried out by two independent raters 
with high inter-rater reliability (ranging from Kappa=.64, SE=.05 to Kappa=.84, SE=.06). 
Memories that were discarded were clearly not autobiographical in nature and were examples of 
future intentions (i.e., prospective memory), semantic mind-pops (see Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 
2004, for a detailed definition), tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, or current thoughts/daydreams.  
For those involuntary memories that were reported by participants as being triggered by 
cues presented on the computer, it was possible to calculate retrieval times. When participants 
had an involuntary memory they clicked the mouse and the computer recorded the reaction time. 
Retrieval times were calculated by counting from the present (clicked on) trial, back to the trial 
which presented the word that was reported by the participant to have triggered the involuntary 
memory. For example, if a participant clicked on trial 23 and the reaction time for that trial was 
.84 seconds, and the word which triggered the memory was two trials back, 3.00 seconds would 
be added (i.e., 1.50 seconds per trial) to make a retrieval time of 3.84 seconds.  
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As participants provided multiple observations (i.e., memories) that could not truly be 
treated as independent, the majority of analysis involved using aggregated data (cf. Bernsten & 
Hall, 2004). Thus, for each participant, we calculated means (e.g., mean retrieval time, rehearsal 
rating, etc.) that were then entered into the analysis of variance. When the data were 
dichotomous (i.e., specific vs. general), mean proportions of specific memories were calculated 
for each participant. The frequencies of memories, instead of means, are reported only 
occasionally for descriptive purposes. 
Results 
  Descriptive information. All participants completed the vigilance task successfully with 
an average of 14.38 (SD=.37) targets detected (out of 15). Most importantly, only four out of 37 
participants did not report any involuntary memories throughout the session. These participants 
were not invited back to take part in Session 2 on voluntary autobiographical memory.  
After discarding 18 non-autobiographical memories (14 involuntary and 4 voluntary 
memories), the total number of involuntary memories recalled by the remaining 33 participants 
was 238 with a mean of 7.21 (SD=5.05, range=1-24) per participant. A total number of 
voluntary memories recalled in Session 2 was 602 with a mean of 18.24 (SD=5.22, range=5-24).  
Out of 238 involuntary memories, the majority (i.e., 91%) were reported to have 
identifiable triggers. Out of 217 memories with reported triggers, 201 (93%) were triggered by 
phrases presented on the computer screen with only 2 memories (1%) being triggered by other 
environmental cues, and 14 (6%) by internal thoughts. It is also interesting that participants 
reported idiosyncratic sets of cue-phrases. There were only 22 cues that were reported by more 
than one participant with the majority (N=14) being reported by two participants, and the 
remaining 8 cues by either three (N=4), four (N=3) and five (N=1) participants. 
Comparing involuntary and voluntary memories  
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Retrieval times. The retrieval times of those involuntary memories that were reported to 
have been triggered by a cue-phrase in Session 1 were calculated individually for each memory 
as described at the end of the method section. For voluntary memories in Session 2, the retrieval 
times were simply reaction times from the moment participants saw the cue-phrase on the screen 
until they pressed a button to report a memory. The mean retrieval time for involuntary 
memories was 5.06 seconds (SD=3.86) and was significantly faster than the mean retrieval time 
of 9.74 seconds (SD=5.44) for voluntary memories, F(1,31)= 13.85, p=.001, η²=.31.  
Characteristics of memories 
 The overall mean ratings for all recorded memory characteristics (see Table 1) were 
entered into several repeated measures ANOVAs with type of memory (involuntary vs. 
voluntary) as an independent variable. The mean proportion of specific involuntary memories 
(M=.80) was significantly higher than that of voluntary autobiographical memories (M=.69), 
F(1,32) = 11.61, p=.002, η²=.30.  There were no differences between involuntary and voluntary 
memories in terms of any other memory characteristics (largest F=2.71). 
The relationship between memories and cues 
First, we examined the number of memories as a function of cue valence and memory 
type. The mean number of involuntary and voluntary memories that were triggered by negative, 
positive and neutral cues were calculated (see the top panel of Table 2) and entered into 2 
(memory type: involuntary, voluntary) x 3 (cue-valence: negative, neutral, positive) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Unsurprisingly, this analysis revealed a main effect of memory type 
F(1,31)=106.33, p<.001, η²=.77, as participants recalled more voluntary memories in Session 2 
than involuntary memories in Session 1. The main effect of cue valence was not significant 
(F<1). However, there was an interaction between memory type and cue valence F(1,30)= 6.05, 
p=.006, η²=.29. Follow-up tests showed that the number of voluntary memories retrieved to 
negative, neutral and positive cues in Session 2 did not differ (smallest p=.10). However, the 
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mean number of involuntary memories triggered by negative cues (M=2.75, SD=1.97) was 
reliably higher than those triggered by positive (M=1.94, SD=2.06) and neutral cues (M=1.53, 
SD=1.63) (p=.04 and p=.002, respectively), which did not differ from each other (p=.27). 
To examine the correspondence between the valence of cue-phrases and participants’ 
own ratings of the emotional valence of memories, overall mean emotional valence ratings were 
calculated as a function of cue-type (negative, neutral, positive) and were entered into a 2 
(memory type: involuntary, voluntary) x 3 (cue-valence: negative, neutral, positive) repeated 
measures ANOVA (see Table 3 for means). There was a significant main effect of cue-valence 
F(2,26)=32.46, p<.001, η²=.71. Planned comparisons revealed that memories retrieved to 
positive cues were rated significantly higher (M=3.97, SD=1.00) than memories retrieved to 
neutral cues (M=3.74, SD=.73) (p=.02) that, in turn, were rated as more positive than those 
retrieved to negative cue-phrases (M=2.29, SD=1.00) (p=.02). The main effect of memory type 
and the memory type by cue-valence interaction were not significant (Fs<1). 
Discussion 
 Several novel findings emerged from Study 1. First of all, the results showed that 
involuntary memories were retrieved within 5 seconds and almost twice as fast as voluntary 
memories. In fact, their retrieval times were probably shorter as it could take participants 1 or 2 
seconds (if not longer) to realise that what was passing through their mind was a memory from 
their past. This would reduce retrieval times to 2-3 seconds and would thus be similar to 
“directly retrieved” memories reported by Haque and Conway (2001). It is important, however, 
that involuntary memories were not of very recent events as suggested by Conway (2005). On 
average, they were between four and five years old and did not differ from voluntary memories.  
 On the other hand, interesting differences between the two forms of memory emerged 
for the hitherto unexplored variable – the emotional valence of cues. Thus, unlike voluntary 
memories, involuntary memories were more likely to be triggered by negative cues than either 
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positive or neutral cues. This finding cannot entirely be accounted for by lower ratings of 
concreteness and imagery obtained for negative cue-phrases (see method section). If anything, 
research on voluntary autobiographical memories suggests that high imagery concrete words are 
more effective cues than more abstract cues (e.g., Williams & Ellis, 1999). It is possible that this 
increased propensity of negative cues to elicit involuntary memories serves an adaptive function 
to warn or remind the person of similar events experienced in the past (cf. Schank, 1999). 
Furthermore, results also showed that there was a high correspondence between the 
emotional valence of the cues and participants’ ratings of emotional valence of their involuntary 
and voluntary memories. Given that emotional valence of involuntary memories also affects 
current mood in a congruent way (see Berntsen, 1996), negative involuntary memories can 
therefore have a negative effect on participant’s current mood (Schlagman et al., 2007). This 
finding may have important practical implications for a variety of clinical conditions where 
patients may be inadvertently exposed to negative cues and therefore would be vulnerable to 
experiencing specific negative involuntary autobiographical memories. Clearly, this is an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
A final methodological point relates to the imagery and concreteness of cue-phrases. 
Although analysis presented in the method section showed that there were no differences 
between the cue-phrases presented in the involuntary and voluntary sessions, there is a 
possibility that out of 800 cue-phrases, presented in the involuntary session, participants recalled 
memories in response to those cues that had higher overall ratings of imagery and concreteness 
than the cue-phrases used in the voluntary session. In order to examine this possibility, for each 
participant we calculated the mean concreteness and imagery levels of those cue phrases that 
elicited/prompted their involuntary and voluntary memories, using the available ratings of these 
words from a previous sample of independent raters (see method section, p. 10). The results of 
1-way within subjects ANOVA showed that the participants’ involuntary and voluntary cue-
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phrases did not differ in terms of imagery (M=4.67, SD=.45 and M=4.73, SD=.08, respectively) 
or concreteness (M=4.62, SD=.09 and M=4.69, SD=.58, respectively) (Fs<1). 
Study 2 
 Although results of Study 1 are theoretically important and may also have practical 
implications for some clinical populations, they should be treated with caution for several 
reasons. First, it is necessary to show that the findings are replicable across studies using 
different samples. The second important question that needs to be answered concerns the 
ecological validity of involuntary memories elicited in the laboratory: are they representative of 
everyday involuntary memories that have been sampled in previous diary studies? (see 
Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004). In order to address these questions, participants in Study 2 
completed two laboratory sessions (like in Study 1), but in addition, kept a diary of their 
everyday involuntary memories during the week in between the two sessions. It was expected 
that while involuntary memories elicited in the laboratory would not be different from 
involuntary memories recorded in the diary, they would both differ from voluntarily retrieved 
autobiographical memories in terms of specificity, i.e., that they would be more specific than 
voluntary memories.  
An additional aim of Study 2 was to examine the possibility that participants in Study 1 
tried to deliberately recall memories in the involuntary session to please the experimenter. To 
address the question about demand characteristics, participants in Study 2 completed a measure 
of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). If involuntary memories are indeed 
deliberately recalled to please the researcher, then there should be a positive correlation between 
participants’ social desirability scores and the number of reported involuntary memories.  
Finally, several minor changes were made to the autobiographical memory questionnaire 
used in Study 1. Firstly, a new question about the vividness of memory image was added to the 
questionnaire (see Berntsen & Hall, 2004). Second, the scale points for the rehearsal question 
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were made more specific by asking participants how many times they had thought of the 
memory before (‘never’, ‘once or twice’, ‘a few times’, ‘several times’ and ‘many times’) 
instead of how frequently they had thought of the memory (‘never’, ‘sometimes’, ‘often’, ‘quite 
often’ and ‘very often’). The most important change concerned the question about the emotional 
valence of the memory (i.e., ‘what is the emotional valence of your memory?’). Since some 
participants in Study 1 needed clarification of the meaning of the term ‘emotional valence’, the 
wording of this question was changed to “how pleasant or unpleasant is your memory?” In 
addition, in Study 1, it was not quite clear whether participants rated the emotional valence of 
their memories per se, the original event when they first experienced it or a mixture of both. 
Previous research has shown that retrospective evaluations of negative emotions become less 
intense over time (Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997) and that, at least in older adults, ratings of 
autobiographical memories become more positive over time (Field, 1981; Kennedy, Mather, & 
Carstensen, 2004; Levine, & Bluck, 1997; Schlagman, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2006). To 
address this issue, an additional question requesting ratings of the pleasantness of the original 
event when it first occurred was included, i.e., we distinguished between the pleasantness of the 
memory and of the original event. This allowed us to examine whether the fading effect 
previously obtained on voluntary memories would be also present in involuntary memories.  
Method 
 Participants. Forty-four psychology undergraduates (19 males and 25 females) with a 
mean age of 21.02 years (SD=2.41, range=18-28) took part in the study in return for course 
credit. English was the first language of all participants.  
 Materials/Procedure 
 The materials and procedure used in Study 2 for Session 1 and Session 2 were very 
similar to Study 1 except for the amendments and additions detailed below.  
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  Session 1: Involuntary recall. The vigilance task used was a shortened version of that 
used in Study 1. The number of trials was reduced to 600 (11 target stimuli and 589 non-target 
stimuli), which shortened the length of the SuperLab program to 15-minutes. This reduction was 
made to take into account the cognitive slowing of older adults (aged 70 to 80) who also took 
part in the study. However, in this paper, only the results of young participants are reported.  
Diaries. At the end of Session 1, all participants were provided with a diary, in the form 
of a notebook, containing 30 questionnaires, one to be completed for each involuntary 
autobiographical memory they experienced. They were given detailed verbal and written 
instructions of how to complete the diary. The nature of involuntary autobiographical memories 
was explained again and it was reiterated that involuntary memories might be general or 
specific, recent or remote.  
 Participants carried the diaries with them at all convenient times for a period of seven 
days and completed a questionnaire immediately, or as soon as possible, after the occurrence of 
an involuntary autobiographical memory. If participants were unable to complete the 
questionnaire immediately but later felt they had forgotten key characteristics a space was 
provided for them to record this in the form of a tick. There were no restrictions on how many 
memories were recorded each day.  
Session 2: Voluntary recall. Participants were presented with 30 cue-phrases (10 
negative, 10 neutral and 10 positive). The procedure for the voluntary autobiographical memory 
task was the same as in Study 1. However, at the end of the session, participants completed the 
Marlowe-Crowne Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) which is a 33-item measure of social 
desirability with true/false response format. Typical items include “I’m always willing to admit 
it when I make a mistake”, or “I have never intensely disliked someone”. Scores can range from 
0 to 33 with higher scores indicating greater social desirability.  
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Autobiographical memory questionnaire. The questionnaire used to record 
autobiographical memories was similar to the questionnaire used in Study 1 except the 
following additions/changes. On page one, an additional question required participants to rate 
the vividness of the memory on a 7-point scale (1=very vague, almost no image at all; 7=very 
vivid, almost like normal vision). On page two, an additional question concerned the emotional 
valence of original event ‘how pleasant or unpleasant was the remembered event at the time you 
experienced it’ (1=very unpleasant; 3=neutral; 5=very pleasant). Finally, the wording was 
changed for the question concerning the emotional valence of the memory (‘how pleasant or 
unpleasant was your memory’, 1=very unpleasant; 3=neutral; 5=very pleasant) and for the scale 
points of the question concerning prior rehearsal (1=never; 2=once or twice; 3=a few times; 
4=several times; 5= many times).  
Results 
Number of involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories 
 In Session 1, all participants completed the vigilance task successfully with an average 
of 10.70 (SD=0.59) targets being detected out of a possible 11. Out of 44 participants, only three 
did not report experiencing any involuntary memories during Session 1. Having discarded 71 
non-autobiographical memories (15 laboratory involuntary, 29 diary involuntary and 27 
voluntary), the remaining 41 participants reported a total of 251 involuntary memories with a 
mean of 6.12 (SD=3.81, range=1-18) per participant in Session 1. A total of 441 involuntary 
memories were recorded in full in the diaries over seven days, with a mean of 10.05 (SD=5.46, 
range=1-25) memories. In addition, a total of 308 involuntary memories were recorded in diaries 
in the form of a tick with a mean of 7.16 (SD=10.91, range=0-44). Finally, a total of 1063 
voluntary autobiographical memories were recalled during Session 2 with a mean of 24.16 
(SD=6.10, Range=8-30) per participant. 
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  The number of memories, regardless of type, was not related to participants’ social 
desirability scores (laboratory memories r(43)=.02, p=.91; diary memories r(43)=.-09, p=.58; 
voluntary memories r(43)=.08, p=.64).   
Comparing the retrieval context of laboratory and diary involuntary memories  
 Triggers. The majority of both laboratory (87%) and diary (77%) involuntary memories 
were reported to have been triggered as opposed to not triggered. However, the percentage of 
external triggers was higher for laboratory than diary involuntary memories (79% vs. 53%), 
whereas this pattern was reversed for internal triggers (8% vs. 24%) and no triggers (13% vs. 
23%) where percentages were higher for diary memories, χ2(2) = 49.91, p<.001. Like in Study 
1, out of the 217 laboratory involuntary memories that were triggered, 191 memories (88%) 
were triggered by phrases presented on the computer screen with only 7 memories (3%) and 19 
memories (9%) triggered by other environmental cues and by internal thoughts, respectively.  
 Concentration. The mean concentration ratings for laboratory involuntary memories was 
3.57 (SD=.78, range=1-5) and for diary involuntary memories was 3.03 (SD=0.74, range=1-5). 
Thus, on average, participants reported medium levels of concentration. However, the results of 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed that mean concentration rating for laboratory 
memories was reliably higher than for diary memories F(1,39)=20.99, p<.001, η²=.35.  
Comparing the characteristics of involuntary and voluntary memories 
 Overall mean ratings of memory characteristics were entered into several one-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs with type of memory (laboratory, diary, voluntary) as the 
independent variable (see Table 4 for means). There were no differences between laboratory, 
diary and voluntary memories in terms of vividness, unusualness or age of memory (all 
Fs<1.51). However, there was a significant main effect of specificity F(2,80)=11.11, p<.001, 
η²=.22 and rehearsal F(2,80)=9.92, p<.001, η²=.20. With regards to specificity, planned 
comparisons revealed that there was no difference between the proportions of specific laboratory 
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and diary involuntary memories (p=.72). However, there was a significantly higher proportion 
of specific laboratory and diary involuntary memories compared to voluntary memories 
(ps<.001). Post hoc analysis of rehearsal ratings revealed that the mean rehearsal ratings for both 
laboratory and diary involuntary memories were higher compared to voluntary memories 
(p<.001 and p=.01 respectively). Although the mean rehearsal ratings of involuntary laboratory 
memories (M=2.93) was somewhat higher than for diary memories (M=2.67) the difference was 
not statistically significant at .05 level (p=.06).   
 In order to examine the pleasantness of memories and of original events, overall means 
(also presented in Table 4) were entered into a 3 (memory type: laboratory, diary, voluntary) x 2 
(time: memory now, original event) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main 
effect of time F(1,40)=9.59, p=.004, η²=.20 with pleasantness ratings of ‘now’ (M=3.30) being 
higher compared to ‘then’ (M=3.12). The main effect of memory type was not significant (F<1). 
There was, however, a significant memory type by time interaction F(1,80)=6.37, p=.003, 
η²=.14. Follow-up tests showed that there was a reliable difference between pleasantness ratings 
of memory now and original event for laboratory involuntary memories (p<.001), and for diary 
involuntary memories this difference was marginally significant (p=.06). However, for 
voluntary memories this difference was not significant (p=.45). Thus, involuntary laboratory and 
diary memories were rated as more pleasant over time but for voluntary memories there was no 
difference between pleasantness ratings of the original event and the memory.  
Comparing laboratory involuntary and voluntary memories  
Retrieval times. Like in Study 1, the mean retrieval time of involuntary memories was 
4.61 seconds (SD=3.81) which was significantly faster than the mean retrieval time of voluntary 
autobiographical memories – 10.13 seconds (SD=4.26), F(1,37)=41.08, p<.0001, η²=.53.  
The relationship between memories and cues. The mean number of involuntary and 
voluntary memories that were triggered/prompted by negative, positive and neutral cues were 
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calculated (see the bottom section of Table 2) and entered into 2 (memory type: involuntary, 
voluntary) x 3 (cue-valence: negative, neutral, positive) repeated measures ANOVA. Like in 
Study 1, there was a significant interaction between memory type and cue valence F(2,76)= 
5.60, p=.005, η²=.13. Post hoc comparisons showed that the mean number of voluntary 
memories retrieved to negative, neutral and positive cues in Session 2 did not differ (smallest 
p=.44). However, the mean number of involuntary memories triggered by negative cues 
(M=2.41) was reliably higher than the mean number of memories triggered by both positive 
cues (M=1.18) and neutral cues (M=1.44) (p=.01 and p<.001, respectively), whereas the 
difference between the mean number of memories triggered by positive and neutral cues was not 
significant (p=.40). 
Finally, the relationship between cue valence and memory valence was examined. 
Overall mean pleasantness ratings for the memories were calculated as a function of cue-type 
(negative, neutral and positive) and were entered into a 2 (memory type: involuntary, voluntary) 
x 3 (cue-valence: negative, neutral, positive) repeated measures ANOVA (for means see the 
bottom section of Table 3). Like in Study 1, there was a main effect of cue-valence 
F(2,24)=19.29, p<.001, η²=.62 (The lower degree of freedom reflects the smaller number of 
participants included in this analysis because not all participants reported memories to all three 
cue-valence categories). Planned comparisons showed that memories retrieved to positive cues 
were rated significantly higher (M=3.94) than memories retrieved to neutral cues (M=3.42) 
(p=.03) that, in turn, were rated as more positive than those retrieved to negative cue-phrases 
(M=2.60) (p=.003). The main effect of memory type and the memory type by cue-valence 
interaction were not significant (Fs<1). 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 both replicated and extended the findings of Study 1 in several 
important ways. First, almost all the comparisons between laboratory involuntary and voluntary 
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memories resulted in findings that were identical to Study 1. Thus, involuntary laboratory 
memories were reported to be more specific compared to voluntarily retrieved memories and 
their retrieval times were again reliably faster than those of voluntary memories. Additionally, 
there was a high correspondence between the emotional valence of the cues and participants’ 
ratings of how pleasant their memories were for both laboratory involuntary memories and 
voluntary memories. Finally, like in Study 1, voluntary memories were equally likely to be 
retrieved to negative, neutral and positive cues, however, a larger number of involuntary 
memories were triggered by negative cues than positive or neutral cues.  
The inclusion of an additional diary study of involuntary autobiographical memories in 
Study 2 allowed us to test the ecological validity of the laboratory involuntary memories by 
comparing them to the involuntary diary memories recorded by the same participants. The 
findings showed that there were no differences between them in terms of memory 
characteristics. However, both laboratory and diary involuntary memories were found to differ 
from voluntarily retrieved memories on several important variables. First, involuntary laboratory 
and involuntary diary memories were more specific compared to voluntary memories. Second, 
the results showed that the so called fading effect (i.e., memories being rated as more positive 
now than the original event) was present in both laboratory and diary involuntary memories but 
not in the voluntarily retrieved memories in Session 2. The fading effect has previously been 
found in voluntary autobiographical memories (e.g., Walker et al., 1997). However, in the 
present study the pleasantness ratings of voluntary memories and original event did not differ. 
The discrepant findings for voluntary memories could be partly due to some methodological 
differences between the studies. Indeed, in most of the previous studies participants had to rate 
the pleasantness of the same memories at several retention intervals with ratings of these 
memories becoming more positive over time (Walker et al., 1997) while in the present study the 
ratings of memories and the original event were obtained at the same point in time.  
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Finally, both laboratory and diary involuntary memories were more rehearsed than 
voluntary memories. Although this finding further emphasizes similarities between laboratory 
and diary involuntary memories, it contradicts the results of Study 1 where no differences were 
found between involuntary and voluntary memories in terms of rehearsal ratings. This lack of 
replication could be due to different scales being used for rehearsal ratings. In Study 2 the scale 
was more refined and included options of ‘once or twice’ and ‘a few times’ as opposed to 
‘sometimes’ and ‘often’ used in Study 1. It should be pointed out however, that the mean 
rehearsal ratings for all three types of memories are fairly low and below point 3 representing “a 
few times” on the scale. 
 An additional, and methodologically important finding, was that the number of 
involuntary memories experienced during the laboratory session was not related to scores of 
social desirability indicating that participants were not reporting involuntary memories because 
of demand characteristics. 
General Discussion 
The major aim of this paper was to systematically examine the similarities and 
differences between involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories by comparing their 
memory characteristics and, importantly, their retrieval processes. An additional aim was to test 
the validity of the new method by comparing involuntary memories elicited in the laboratory to 
everyday involuntary memories recorded in diaries. In this section we first summarise the most 
important findings from the two studies and then discuss their theoretical implications for 
current research of autobiographical memory. This will be followed by a brief discussion of 
some methodological issues, including criticisms of our method, as well as potential avenues for 
future research. 
The first set of findings concern the direct comparisons between involuntary and 
voluntary memories. The results showed that involuntary and voluntary memories did not differ 
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in terms of several memory characteristics such as vividness, unusualness, pleasantness and age 
of the memory. However, major differences between the two types of memories emerged for 
several other variables. For example, involuntary memories were significantly more likely to be 
of specific events than voluntary memories, which replicates the findings of previous diary 
studies that also compared the specificity of involuntary and voluntary autobiographical 
memories (see Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004). Most importantly, involuntary 
memories were retrieved within four to five seconds and almost twice as fast as voluntary 
memories. Thus, specific involuntary memories were coming to mind relatively quickly and 
without any deliberate effort while voluntary memories, retrieved in Session 2, provide further 
support to the general view that retrieval of autobiographical memories is slow and effortful, 
taking time to construct specific events (see Rubin, 1998; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997a; 1997b).  
An additional difference between involuntary and voluntary memories concerns the 
emotional valence of cues. Thus, voluntary memories were as likely to be retrieved to negative, 
positive and neutral cues, whereas involuntary memories were more likely to be triggered by 
negative cues. This finding would have been impossible to obtain without a laboratory method 
and it may have interesting theoretical implications. Thus, if negative stimuli in the environment 
are more likely to trigger past experiences this may act as either a warning sign of what 
happened previously or as a reassurance that the previous outcome was not negative. Therefore, 
it can be argued that in everyday life these involuntary memories may serve some adaptive 
function by protecting individuals from potentially harmful or unpleasant events/experiences (cf. 
Schlagman et al., 2006). This is somewhat in line with the so-called warning signal hypothesis 
in relation to the intrusive memories experienced by individuals with Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) (e.g., Ehlers, Hackmann, Steil, Cohessy, Wenninger, & Winter, 2002). 
Intrusive memories in PTSD are often of events that occurred just prior to the traumatic 
experience, for example, a patient who had experienced a head-on car crash at night kept seeing 
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headlights coming toward her (Ehlers, et al., 2002; Ehlers, Michael, Chen, Payne, & Shan, 
2006). Therefore, it is assumed that one mechanism behind such memories might be to warn the 
individual of immediate danger. In patients with PTSD such memories are usually always 
triggered, but not necessarily by negative stimuli. For example, the intrusive memory described 
above was often triggered by any round patches of light on a dark surface. Thus, intrusive 
memories might be an extreme manifestation of a possible normal function of involuntary 
memories.  
The second set of findings concerns the comparisons between laboratory and diary 
involuntary memories. The results showed that they did not differ in terms of any memory 
characteristics (e.g., specificity, emotional valence, rehearsal ratings, age of memory). In 
addition, when compared to voluntary memories, they showed similar patterns of differences in 
terms of specificity, rehearsal and the fading effect. Taken together, these findings indicate that 
the involuntary memories elicited in the laboratory are representative of involuntary memories 
experienced in everyday life. Despite the similarities there were some minor differences in terms 
of number of reported memories and external triggers. Thus, on average, six memories were 
reported per participant in the laboratory session, whereas only two to three memories were 
recorded per day in diaries (for similar results see Berntsen, 1996; 1998; Kvavilasvhili & 
Mandler, 2004). The number of reported external triggers was also higher in the laboratory than 
in the diary. However, these differences are hardly surprising given that in the laboratory 
participants were engaged in relatively undemanding vigilance task and exposed to hundreds of 
cues within a short space of time whereas in everyday life people are often engaged in more 
demanding activities and thus, may be less likely to notice potential cues. 
Theoretical implications 
The results of this paper have important theoretical implications for current research on 
autobiographical memory. For example, they provide initial evidence that the so called “directly 
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retrieved” memories, observed occasionally in voluntary memory experiments, and the 
involuntary memories, that are spontaneously recalled when one is not in the “retrieval” mode, 
may be quite similar and possibly based on the same retrieval mechanism. Although involuntary 
memories in the present study were recalled within 4 to 5 seconds, these somewhat longer 
reaction times were most probably due to the fact that participants needed a few seconds to 
realise that what they were thinking about was actually a memory (cf. Schooler, Reichle, & 
Halpetn, 2005). Therefore, the ‘true’ retrieval time of involuntary memories may be 
approximately two to three seconds which is similar to that of directly retrieved memories in the 
voluntary memory experiments.  
The important question that needs to be answered concerns the underlying mechanisms 
of these ‘directly retrieved’ memories and involuntary memories. Are they mediated by 
reconstructive or reproductive retrieval processes? According to the most influential model of 
autobiographical memory, knowledge of one’s past is distributed across a hierarchical system 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Therefore, specific memories are not represented by a single 
memory trace but rather “memories are transitory dynamic mental constructions” (p. 261) that 
are formed by combining information from various levels of the autobiographical memory 
knowledge base (also see Conway, 2005). Thus, voluntary retrieval of autobiographical 
memories follows the hierarchy top-down as lifetime period information enables access to 
general events, which in turn facilitates access to fragmentary sensory, perceptual and affective 
information that represent the specific details of a past event. 
In contrast, with respect to involuntary autobiographical memories, the prevailing 
theoretical assumption is that they are directly retrieved from a separate pool of memories. 
Berntsen (1998), for example, proposed a ‘double model’ of autobiographical memory in which 
two different autobiographical knowledge systems exist. One system records and stores specific 
memories as single representations, the other contains more abstract information such as lifetime 
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periods. On occasions, these specific memories can be directly accessed in response to salient 
cues. Similarly, Conway (2005) suggests that involuntary memories are directly retrieved from a 
separate pool of recent memories that have not yet been consolidated into the long-term 
autobiographical memory system.  
However, the results of the present study, concerning the retrieval times and 
characteristics of involuntary memories, do not seem to support the views of Berntsen (1998) 
and Conway (2005). Indeed, involuntary memories were not of very recent events as their mean 
age was between 4 and 5 years in both studies (see Ball & Little, 2006, for similar results). In 
addition, approximately 20% of involuntary memories concerned general as opposed to specific 
events, which goes against the idea that these memories are retrieved from a separate pool of 
most recent and specific memories. 
The only way to explain these findings is to suggest that involuntary memories are 
retrieved from the same autobiographical memory knowledge base as voluntary memories and 
that their retrieval follows the same top-down (and probably reconstructive) process proposed 
for voluntary memories. However, the major difference between involuntary and voluntary 
autobiographical memories lies in the way in which the information in the autobiographical 
memory system is activated. The spreading of activation during voluntary retrieval is 
deliberately directed by the rememberer in a conscious effort to recall. In contrast, the spreading 
of activation during involuntary retrieval occurs automatically, without conscious awareness, 
and in response to some accidental stimuli in one’s environment or thoughts. Additional support 
for this idea comes from the retrieval time data. Indeed, our results show that it takes on average 
between 4 to 5 seconds to report an involuntary autobiographical memory with a ‘true’ retrieval 
time possibly being 1 or 2 seconds shorter. If the spreading of activation in response to a cue 
within the system is fast and automatic, then it should be possible to reach the bottom of the 
hierarchy and construct a specific memory within this time period. Moreover, if this top-down 
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spread of activation is for some reason terminated or interrupted before reaching lower levels of 
hierarchy this will result in the recall of general involuntary memories as discussed above.  
A diary study of Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004) on involuntary semantic memories or 
mind-pops (i.e., sudden occurrence of contents of one’s semantic knowledge such as someone’s 
name, a word or a tune) has shown that encountered stimuli elicit fairly long lasting activations 
in the network of one’s semantic knowledge. For example, hearing a word ‘actor’ may 
subconsciously activate the names of several actors so that later on one of these names pops up 
unexpectedly. The results of the present study suggest that encountered stimuli might also elicit 
spread of activations in the network of autobiographical knowledge as well. If such automatic 
spread of activation did not occur in response to the cue-phrases encountered on the screen it 
would be impossible to explain the occurrence of involuntary memories in response to some of 
these stimuli. In fact, one could argue that in the voluntary memory experiments participants 
start to deliberately search for a memory only when this fast and automatic spread of activation 
in response to a cue word does not result in a formation of a memory. When it does, the 
participant experiences the so called “direct retrieval” as a memory seems to pop up even before 
the participant started a deliberate search for the memory in response to a cue.   
 Therefore, an important theoretical question that remains to be answered is why certain 
stimuli in the environment elicit an involuntary memory and the others do not? In other words, 
what are the factors that determine whether a certain pattern of activation in the autobiographical 
knowledge base, instigated by the stimuli, reach consciousness in the form of involuntary 
memory? One interesting possibility is that for a cue to trigger a particular memory, this 
memory or its fragments should have already been partially activated in the recent past (see 
Berntsen, 2007). It is interesting that initial support for this priming hypothesis has been 
obtained by Mace (2005) in a study in which participants completed a diary of their involuntary 
autobiographical memories for a period of two weeks. At the end of the first week, participants 
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were asked to voluntarily recall memories from a specific lifetime period (e.g., high school or 
when they were between 13 to16 years old) for 30 minutes. After this, participants continued to 
record their involuntary memories in a diary for a further week. The results showed that 
participants who had been primed for a particular lifetime period in the laboratory, involuntarily 
recalled a larger proportion of memories from this period during the following week than the 
controls. Importantly, these memories were not identical to memories deliberately recalled in the 
laboratory, they were of different events but from the same time period. 
An alternative possibility is that for a cue to elicit an involuntary memory there must be 
a perfect match between the content of the cue (e.g., hearing a song about red roses) and the 
central features of a particular memory (e.g., receiving a bunch of red roses on your first date) 
(see e.g., Ball, Mace & Corona, 2007; Berntsen, 1998; Schlagman et al., 2007). This could 
explain the relatively small number of memories reported by participants in our studies even 
though they were exposed to hundreds of cues during the vigilance task. One logical implication 
of this position is that the same cue would elicit the same involuntary memory every time it is 
encountered (due to its perfect match with the central features of that particular memory). 
However, everyday observations suggest that this may not be the case. The most plausible 
assumption would be that the elicitation of a particular involuntary memory is due to some 
combination of these two factors. Clearly, this would be an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
Methodological issues 
 Apart from theoretical input, the results of the present paper also have important 
methodological implications for research on involuntary memories. First, they show that 
involuntary memories can be elicited in the laboratory as the majority of participants did report 
one or more involuntary memories during the undemanding vigilance task. Second, the majority 
of memories were triggered by irrelevant cue-phrases presented on the screen, and this allowed 
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us to reliably measure the retrieval times of involuntary memories and compare them with 
voluntary memories. Third, it was also possible to manipulate the emotional valence of cues and 
observe their effects on the number and the character of elicited memories.    
Since developing the new method in 2003 (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2003) the 
importance of laboratory-based methods for studying involuntary autobiographical memory has 
been emphasised by several other researchers that have also started working on the design of 
such methods. For example, Mace (2006) had participants deliberately recall autobiographical 
memories in response to cue words and report any involuntary memories triggered by these 
voluntary memories (so-called memory chaining). The results showed that in 46% of cases the 
recall of a voluntary memory was followed by the recall of an involuntary memory. On the other 
hand, Ball (2007) used a method where participants had to generate continuous free associations 
to word cues for 20-30 seconds per word while being tape-recorded. At the end of the session, 
participants listened to their taped free associations and indicated if and/or when they had 
experienced an involuntary memory. Involuntary autobiographical memories were reported 
during 86% of trials. Finally, Watkins et al. (2005) used a 30-minute think aloud task while 
simultaneously presenting a range of stimuli (music, pictures and scents) to participants. Any 
thoughts considered to be autobiographical memories were noted by the experimenter and 
verified with the participant at the end of the session. If the participant agreed that it was a 
memory s/he had to indicate whether the memory had come to mind involuntarily or voluntarily. 
The methods used by Ball (2007) and Watkins et al. (2005) are different from the 
method presented here in that they both rely on participants’ retrospective evaluations. On the 
other hand, like the present method, Mace (2006) attempts to catch involuntary autobiographical 
memories ‘on-line’ as they occur during the session but can only sample involuntary memories 
that are triggered by the preceding voluntarily retrieved memories. However, involuntary 
memories triggered in this way occur fairly infrequently in everyday life. For example, in a 
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diary study by Mace (2005), these memories constituted only 10-12% of all recorded 
involuntary memories. Therefore, what makes the method developed in this paper different is 
that it attempts to simulate the conditions in which involuntary autobiographical memories occur 
in everyday life. One major advantage of the method lies in its ability to allow researchers to 
measure the retrieval times of involuntary autobiographical memories. In contrast, an advantage 
of methods used by Ball (2007) and Watkins et al., (2005) is that they do not inform the 
participants of the nature of involuntary autobiographical memories in advance, which reduces 
or eliminates the possibility of demand characteristics in the experiment.  
Clearly, by informing participants of the concept of involuntary memories in advance 
there is the risk that they might assume that it is the main focus of the study and deliberately 
retrieve memories to please the experimenter. It is also possible that participants may have tried 
to recall memories in order to bring some variety into the (somewhat) monotonous vigilance 
task. However, in Study 2, demand characteristics were examined by taking measures of social 
desirability but no relationship was found between social desirability scores and the number of 
memories reported. Most importantly, if participants were deliberately retrieving memories in 
the involuntary memory session, then it is unclear why they recalled more specific memories 
and almost twice as fast as in the voluntary session.  
 Another potential criticism of our method it that differences obtained between 
involuntary and voluntary memories were due to different demands of the two sessions as 
participants had to retrieve and record a larger number of voluntary memories than involuntary 
memories. In addition, participants always carried out the voluntary session last, which raises 
issues of potential order effects. Although these criticisms are valid it is unlikely that they can 
entirely account for the obtained pattern of results. First, retrieval times and specificity of 
memories were examined for the first 10 voluntary memories retrieved and the results remained 
the same. For example, in Study 2 the average retrieval time for the first 10 voluntary memories 
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was 9.07 seconds (SD=4.79) and the mean proportion of specific memories was .62 (SD=.17). 
Second, the delay between the two sessions was one week which makes it unlikely that 
involuntary memories retrieved in Session 1 affected voluntary memories in Session 2. Also, in 
a recent study, Ball (2007) counterbalanced the order in which participants carried out 
involuntary and voluntary memory tasks. Although Ball found differences between involuntary 
and voluntary memories in terms of their specificity, importantly, he did not find any effect of 
task order.  
  Despite potential criticisms, it is clear that studying involuntary autobiographical 
memories under more controlled laboratory conditions is beneficial for future research. A range 
of issues that were either difficult or impossible to study with the diary method alone can begin 
to be examined. For example, the strength of the relation between elicitation triggers and 
involuntary memories could be examined by having participants carry out the same vigilance 
task some months after the first session. By providing the same set of cues one could assess 
whether cues directly map to a memory, in which case the same cue would always elicit the 
same memory, or whether other mechanisms such as priming are predominantly involved in the 
retrieval of involuntary autobiographical memories (see Mace, 2005).  
Although diary studies of involuntary memory are important for a thorough 
understanding of the phenomenon, the present method, along with other laboratory-based 
methods, that have been reported recently (Ball, 2007; Mace, 2006; Watkins et al., 2005), will 
undoubtedly stimulate further research in this area (cf. Ball, 2007). Therefore, with 
methodologies that can be easily manipulated we may begin to systematically address questions 
pertaining to the nature, functions and mechanisms of involuntary autobiographical memory. 
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 Table 1 
Overall Mean Proportions of Specific Memories, Ratings of Memory Characteristics and Age of 
Memories as a Function of Memory Type (Involuntary, Voluntary) in Study 1. Standard Deviations in 
Brackets.  
 Involuntary Memories Voluntary Memories 
Specificity a .80 (.15) .69 (.16) 
Unusualness b 3.68 (0.74) 3.48 (0.51) 
Rehearsal b 2.40 (0.64) 2.30 (0.58) 
Emotion b 2.95 (0.80) 3.16 (2.32) 
Age of memory 
(in years) c 
4.85 (4.15) 4.25 (3.13) 
 
a Memories were Rated as Specific or General. Means Represent Mean Proportions of Specific 
Memories Averaged across Participants. 
b Ratings were Made on 5-Point Scales. For Unusualness, Scale Points were 1=Very Common, 
5=Very Unusual. For Rehearsal, Scale Points were 1=Never, 2=Sometimes, 3=Often, 4=Quite Often, 
and 5=Very Often. For Emotional Valence, Scale Points were 1= Very Negative, 3=Neutral, and 
3=Very Positive. 
c For Each Memory, Age was Calculated by Subtracting Age in Memory from Current Chronological 
Age.
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Table 2 
Mean Number of Memories (Standard Deviations in Brackets) as a Function of Memory Type 
(Involuntary, Voluntary) and Cue Valence (Negative, Neutral, Positive) in Study 1and Study 2. 
 Cue Valence 




















Voluntary Memories* 8.13 (1.99) 8.33 (2.12) 8.23 (2.02) 
 
* The larger number of voluntary memories in Study 2 is due to a larger number of cue words 
presented. 
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Table 3 
Mean Emotional Valence Ratings (Standard Deviations in Brackets) as a Function of Memory Type 
(Involuntary vs. Voluntary) and Cue Valence (Negative vs. Neutral vs. Positive) in Study 1 and Study 
2. Ratings were Made on a 5-Point Scale (1= Very Negative, 3=Neutral, and 5=Very Positive). 
 Type of Memory 







Neutral  3.74 (0.73) 3.15 (0.68) 










Neutral  3.60 (1.01) 3.24 (0.48) 
Positive 3.92 (1.15) 3.97 (0.52) 
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Table 4 
Overall Mean Proportions of Specific Memories, Ratings of Memory Characteristics and Age of 
Memories as a Function of Memory Type (Laboratory vs. Diary vs. Voluntary) in Study 2.  
 Type of Memory 
 Laboratory Diary  Voluntary 
Specificity a 0.79 (0.17) 0.80 (0.15) 0.67 (0.10) 
Vividness b 4.95 (1.07) 4.86 (0.75) 5.11 (0.78) 
Unusualness c 3.58 (0.89) 3.45 (0.68) 3.44 (0.47) 
Rehearsal c  2.93 (0.72) 2.67 (0.70) 2.40 (0.58) 
Memory Pleasantness c 3.40  (0.68) 3.29 (0.69) 3.19 (0.81) 
Event Pleasantness c 3.03 (0.90) 3.19 (0.81) 3.15 (0.29) 
Age of memory (in years) d 3.61 (3.33) 3.67 (2.69) 4.07 (1.75) 
 
a Memories were Rated as Specific or General. Means Represent Mean Proportions of Specific 
Memories Averaged across Participants. 
b Ratings were Made on a 7-Point Scale (1=Very Vague, Almost no Image at all; 7=Very Vivid, 
Almost Like Normal Vision). 
c Ratings were Made on 5-Point Scales. For Unusualness, Scale Points were 1=Very Common, 
5=Very Unusual. For Rehearsal, Scale Points were 1=Never, 2=Once or Twice, 3=A Few Times, 
4=Several Times, and 5=Many Times. For Memory and Event Pleasantness, Scale Points were 1= 
Very Unpleasant, 3=Neutral, and 3=Very Pleasant. 
d For Each Memory, Age was Calculated by Subtracting Age in Memory from Current Chronological 
Age
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